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NOTES
THE MYTH OF CONTEXT IN POLITICS AND LAW
Visions of group-based rights' in political and legal theory strive to
be both antiessentialist and antiuniversalist. They reject an essentialist
view of the self — a view that there is a single experience common to
all persons composing, for example, a particular ethnic, racial, or gender group — on the basis that a person's identity is context-based and
contingent, and cannot be defined solely by such factors as race or
gender. 2 They also reject the universalist notion of an abstract equality of persons that is at the basis of traditional conceptions of individual rights. In short, group rights are based on the recognition of
particular differences among persons. Moreover, the antiessentialist
and antiuniversalist spirations of group rights parallel a jurisprudential vision that favors "contextualizing" law, or making "substance"
rather than "form" its keystone. 3 Substantive jurisprudence requires
looking to the circumstances and equities of each individual case and
thus is similarly premised on the recognition of particular differences
among persons.
Yet there is an inconsistency between group rights and their antiessentialist and antiuniversalist foundations, which has important implications for substantive jurisprudence. This Note contends that group
rights fail to be antiessentialist because they implicitly affirm the essentialist presumption that all persons of a particular race or gender
1 Group-based rights means "representational" group-based rights, or group rights that assume a sameness of identity among all persons of a designated group. Such rights, which include

social group representation in deliberative political bodies, certain kinds of affirmative action programs, and race-based legislative districting, are distinct from group-based strategies that do not
implicate identity, such as affirmative action programs that are justified by, for example, the
utilitarian goal of achieving a less race-conscious society. Although representational group rights
also encompass rights to cultural self-determination and self-government — rights that are important in international human rights 'discourse — such rights are beyond the scope of this Note.
2 See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN 3 (1988) ("Any attempt to talk
about all women in terms of something we have in common undermines attempts to talk about
the differences among us, and vice versa."); Roy L. Brooks, Race as an Under-Inclusive and OverInclusive Concept, i APR.-Am. L. & POCV REP. 9, 20 ( 1 994) ("[T]he traditional civil rights concept of race . . . ignores significant internal divisions of socioeconomic class, gender, politics,
sexual orientation, disability, race-gender intersectionality . . . and other intersectionalities."); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585
(1990)3 "Form" is a procedural ideal in which "general and abstract rules [can] produce the kind of

certainty and predictability traditionally identified with the rule of law," and which "presuppose[s]
a homogeneous society with standardized transactions and human interactions that [can] be generalized and abstracted into rules." MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870-1960, at 219 (1992). The ideal of "substance," by contrast, privileges politics, outcomes, empirical circumstances, and difference. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 25-63 (1987).
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share a common identity outside the context of discrimination; 4 the
substantive approach to adjudication that group rights imply likewise
fails to be antiessentialist because it too relies on a conception of unified group identity. This implies that substantive jurisprudence fails
to be antiuniversalist as well: like universal individual rights and rulebound formal jurisprudence, substantive jurisprudence screens out important aspects of substance, context, and identity. This difficulty
brings into question the desirability of "contextualized law."
Part I of this Note discusses universalism and the antiuniversalist
response to it — a response that has provided the basis for both group
rights and antiessentialist arguments. Part II suggests that scholarly
writings demonstrate a tension between group rights and antiessentialism. Although these writings reject the notion that women or minorities share an "essential" identity, the remedial group-based strategies
they propose depend on essentialist assumptions for their coherence.
Part III maintains that this tension carries into the realm of jurisprudence, where contextualized adjudication is urged both because formal
law reflects only one part of human values and because it exhibits
structural biases. Part IV argues that, by implicitly relying on essentialist assumptions, context, as embodied in group rights in the political realm, and substantive justice, in the legal realm, serve to recreate
the universalist problems that they were meant to overcome. Finally,
Part V suggests an alternative way to contextualize law and politics
that does not focus on race or gender.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF GROUP-BASED RIGHTS

A. Liberal Universalism

Conceptions of group-based rights have introduced particularity
and context into a political realm that has traditionally been characterized in liberal thought by abstract rules and individual rights and liberties. 5 The liberal political conception is founded on lassical social
contract theory, modified by Immanuel Kant's replacement of its teleological articulations with a categorical conception of morality in
which free and equal rational persons are capable of acting autono4 This Note addresses only the use of group rights for remedial purposes, that is, situations in
which public policy alters the relative social, economic, or political status of various groups in
society in response to a history of race- or gender-based subordination. It does not address groupbased approaches to confronting particular instances of discrimination, such as disparate impact
analysis, "protected classes" under the civil rights statutes, or levels of judicial scrutiny of racial
and gender classifications in legislative enactments.
5 Although liberal rights and liberties are abstract, actual events prompting legislative refinement and judicial analysis define their meaning and scope. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 8 72 , 890 (1 990 ) ("Values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process."). But
although individual rights become meaningful guides for action only with reference to specific
contexts and situations, they apply universally in their formulation — that is, to all persons, without regard to their particular circumstances and identities.
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mously. 6 Affirming Kantian morality, John Rawls formulated a conception of justice based on "right," rather than any particular vision of
the "common good." 7 In his most recent elaboration of this conception, Rawls contends that an "overlapping consensus" among persons
who hold diverse comprehensive moral views necessitates state neutrality among individual pursuits and the primacy of individual
rights.8
The liberal focus on the individual presupposes difference among
citizens: because individual ends are not homogeneous, they are incompatible with the existence of an overarching common end. 9 But the
universalist assumption at the base of liberal thought is that, because
humans are identical in their status as moral beings, moral obligation
cannot be contingent on individual attributes, merits, or circumstances.
The liberal conception of the moral equality of persons requires that
law have universal application: it must treat all persons identically and
disinterestedly, and its grant of rights and liberties must extend to all
persons in the polity.
Although the rhetoric of state neutrality and universal rights and
liberties corresponds to the rhetoric of individual diversity and tolerance of personal ends, the categorical assumptions within liberalism
have tended to obscure difference. Universal citizenship in the political sphere has implied a commonality of ends in the social and cultural spheres, and a notion that the political community is largely
coterminous with one social and cultural community. 10

B. The Antiuniversalist Alternative
As a result of the growing appreciation that some persons — specifically, racial and ethnic minorities and women — have been disad6 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS passim (James W.
Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785).
7 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 195-257 (1971). This deontologic.al conception of
politics holds that, because all individuals are moral beings, politics should ensure equal respect
for all persons in the political community. See id.
8 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-38 (1993).
9 Cf id. at 47 ("[H]ow is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of
free and equal citizens who still remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical,
and moral doctrines?"). This conception stands in contrast to civic republican and communitarian
theories, in which the aim of politics is to realize a common good for the political community.
See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 1252a1 (Carnes Lord trans., 1984); INTIccoLd MACHIAVELLI,
THE DISCOURSES § L4, at 114 (Bernard Crick ed. & Leslie J. Walker trans., Penguin Books 1983)
(1531); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31-63 (1983).
10 See WILL KYKLICKA, LIBERALISM, CONIMUNITY AND CULTURE 177 (1989). Similarly, in
Iris Young's words, "[m]odem political thought generally assume[s] that the universality of citizenship" implies that "citizenship status transcends particularity and difference." Iris Marion Young,
Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 Enucs 250, 250
(1989). Thus, universal citizenship traditionally has meant two things: (I) "what citizens have in
common as opposed to how they differ," and (2) the existence of laws and rules that "apply to all
in the same way [and] that are blind to individual and group differences!! Id.
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vantaged in political life," and that the political community comprises
radically diverse economic and social pursuits, theorists have called
into question the liberal conception of the political community and the
ideal of individual rights. 12 As a result, the grounding of normative
political theory in universalist premises has been confronted by a recognition that the specific needs of blacks, women, and homosexuals,
among others, cannot be addressed by the universalist principles of
equal individual rights and ostensibly equal opportunities." This recognition of difference within the political community necessitates consideration of the group. To the extent that many individuals have
been discriminated against or subordinated because of their shared differences, individual differences become group differences, which in
turn usher in the concept of group rights as a means of tempering
liberal universalism.
ESSENTIALISM, ANTIESSENTIALISM, AND GROUP RIGHTS

Analogously to liberal universalist assumptions of an abstract
sameness of moral worth among all persons, essentialist arguments
posit a concrete sameness of experience-shaped identity among members of particular groups. Antiessentialist arguments, like the antiuniversalist responses to liberal universalism, deny this assumption.
Thus, visions of group-based rights reject not only a universalist account of morality but also an essentialist account of identity: the presumption of sameness, whether in the form of universal moral equality
or shared identity, obscures biases, nuances, and alternative visions.
But because the notion of a group often relies implicitly on essentialist
premises, group-based approaches to addressing difference often embody a conflict between antiessentialist and essentialist perspectives.
A. (Anti)Essentialism

In the context of minority group rights, essentialism connotes the
idea that there exists a unitary, or essential, experience that is shared
by all women or all blacks simply by virtue of their being female or
black. 14 With regard to women, for example, it is claimed that such
11 That is, a person may be formally accorded equal treatment by the law while being denied
full participation in other spheres of political life and society because of discrimination and prejudice by other, more powerful groups and persons. See Iris Marion Young, Five Faces of Oppression, 19 PHIL. F. 270, 271-72 (1988).
12 See SUSAN MOLLER ORIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 2 47-304 (197).
13 See, e.g., ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 93 (1995) ("Where histories of inequality, deprivation, or exclusion have placed individuals in different relationships to economic
resources and political power, we do not treat them equally when we treat them as if they are the
same.").
14 See Harris, supra note 2, at 585. As Harris argues, see id. at 590-605, essentialism may be
identified in the writings of Catharine MacKinnon and Robin West. See, e.g., CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 71, 190 (1987) (writing about "women's point of view" and
"women's perspective"); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Car. L. REV. I, 3 (1988)
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an essential experience "can be isolated and described independently of
race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience."5
Thus, one component of the antiessentialist perspective is that identity
is contingent, neither the exclusive product of individual choice 16 nor
the natural result of ascriptive 17 racial or gender characteristics or cultural heritage. 18 Instead, as Joan Scott suggests, identities are conferred historically: "subjects are produced through multiple
identifications, . . . [and] the project of history is not to reify identity
but to understand its production as an ongoing process of differentiation, . . . subject to redefinition, resistance and change."19
The point is that identity is not a given: it is produced. Individuals' identities are the product of both the social forces that surround
them and the identity labels that are imposed on them and, to some
degree, internalized by them. 2 ° Therefore, groups cannot be conceived
of as categorically diltinct, because group boundaries themselves must
vary as persons shape their identities through interactions with other
groups and persons.21
B. Group Rights and Antiessentialisin in Tension

The notion of a group right requires the existence of an identifiable
group having an identifiable commonality of pursuits or objectives,
which may be regarded as the bearer, or subject, of the right. Thus, a
(arguing that women are "essentially connected" to "the rest of human life, both materially . .
and existentially!).
15 Harris, supra note 2 2 at 585 (arguing specifically against "gender essentialism").
16 Michael Walzer suggests that if a person does not want to identify with his or her ethnic
origins, he or she has a "right" not to do so. See MICHAEL WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN
AMERICAN 28 (1992).
17 Ascriptive means those objectively identifiable features or characteristics that humans pos-

sess not through choice, but by virtue of having been born with them.
15 Both Will Kynalicka and Charles Taylor suggest that it is natural to establish identity along
the lines of culture. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 10 (1995) (asserting that
"minority groups" are increasingly seeking recognition of "their identity"); Charles Taylor, The
Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM 25, 38-40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) (making the
assumption that the diversity of individual identities — and the "politics of recognition" that it
implies — requires recognition of different cultural groups).
19 Joan W. Scott, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity, in THE IDENTITY IN QUESTION 3, ix (John Rajchman ed., 1995). In Scott's account, the question of identity is historicized
through "an analysis of its production, and thus an analysis of constructions of and conflicts about
power," and through "call[ing] into question the autonomy and stability of any particular identity
as it claims to define and interpret a subject's existence." Id. at 8. Wendy Brown likewise argues
that persons cannot be "reduced to observable social attributes and practices defined empirically,
positivistically, as if their existence were intrinsic and factual, rather than effects of discursive and
institutional power." WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY 66 (1995).
20 See Scott, supra note 19, at 3–II.
21 Comel West likewise recognizes the "political[ly] and ethical[ly] construct{ edj" nature of
identity: "any claim to black authenticity — beyond that of being a potential object of racist
abuse and an heir to a grand tradition of black struggle — [depends] on one's political definition
of black interest and one's ethical understanding of [its relationship] to individuals and communities in and outside black America." CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 25-26 (1993).
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group right implicitly ascribes to group members some type of unified
identity — which creates an inconsistency, or tension, between a denial of essentialist premises and an affirmation of group-based rights.
Nonetheless, as demonstrated by the following brief juxtapositions of
various theorists' arguments, it is not uncommon for writers to affirm
both antiessentialist principles and group rights.22
z. Group Representation in Teaching and Academics. — The role
of women and minorities in academia illustrates this tension. Ruth
Colker clearly rejects an essentialist perspective when she disapprovingly argues that "[w]e are essentialist when we assume a priori that
certain subgroups such as African American women or lesbians will
experience a heightened version of white, heterosexual women's experience."23 On the other hand, Colker argues that affirmative action in
academia is justifiable because, among other reasons, it may "provide
role models for students who are also members of minority groups."24
Thus, for Colker, the role model theory 25 is a "valid rationale for affirmative action in certain settings."26 Yet this rationale implicitly assumes the essentialist premise that students who are black, for
example, regard "blackness" as the characteristic by which they seek
role models and by which they identify.27
22 These juxtapositions are not meant to diminish the writers' arguments. They are merely
illustrative and are intended to reveal a commonplace coexistence of an explicit rejection of essentialist principles, and an implicit acceptance of them through proposals for group rights.
The tension described in this section is discernible in the works of other authors as well.
Compare Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 539, 544 (arguing against the notion
that there is a "monolithic racial/sexual community that does not know class divisions or social
and cultural diversity"), with Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": Securing Black People's Right
to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147, 163 (arguing in favor of a "black
public sphere" in which a "black critical consciousness" may flourish); compare Jerome McCristal
Culp, Jr., Telling a Black Legal Story: Privilege, Authenticity, "Blunders," and Transformation in
Outsider Narratives, 82 VA. L. REV. 69, 79 n.31 (1996) (criticizing as essentialist the view "that to
be black is to be poor, urban, and to have a certain culture"), with Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.,
Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, xpi DUKE L.J. 39, 5x
("[T]here is a Black Jurisprudence and . . . [it] is leading to the development of a Black Legal
Scholarship — a scholarship that ought to be included in the development of legal principles.").
23 Ruth Colker, Abortion and Violence, I WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 93, roo (1994).
24 Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 Oxn) ST. L.J. r, 20
(1995).

25 In simplest terms, the role model justification for affirmative action holds that "affirmative
action is justified in order to provide communities of color with exemplars of success, without
which they might conclude that certain social roles and professional opportunities are closed to
them." Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want
to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 5222, 1223 n.5 (5991).
26 Colker, supra note 24, at 22.
27 See Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 14.4 U. PA. L. REV. 5377,
5400 (1996) (presenting the role model argument that minorities are underrepresented in positions
of social and political significance because they do not see any "of their own," that is, other
minorities, in such positions); see also id. at 1401 (noting that the discussion about black role
models often "involves an implicit assumption that African Americans act as a group," revealing
the "majority's tendency to see African Americans as 'types,' rather than as individuals").
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Richard Delgado, by contrast, argues against the role model justification for affirmative action. His argument, however, stands in tension with some of his other writings. Delgado argues that
professionals of color should reject the job of role model because,
among other reasons, it has a confining effect on identity: "To be a
good role model, you must be an assimilationist, never a cultural or
economic nationalist, separatist, radical reformer, or anything remotely
resembling any of these." 28 Elaborating on this argument elsewhere,
he urges professionals to "seek out more authentic and vital relationships with their constituent communities." 29 Regardless whether this
view is in fact antiessentialist, it at least acknowledges the diversity of
backgrounds and worldviews among minority professionals, thereby
belying the assumption — often attributed to the majority culture —
that all persons of a minority race are somehow the same. Yet this
view exists alongside Delgado's work on "imperial scholar[ship]," in
which he assumes a more essentialist stance, arguing that scholarship
about minority concerns should be penned by minority authors: "The
time has come for white liberal authors who write in the field of civil
rights to redirect their efforts . .•"
. 3° White scholars, he contends,
"[d]espite the best of intentions, . . . may have stereotypes embedded
deep in their psyches that distort their thinking, causing them to balance interests in ways inimical to" the interests of blacks.31
In different ways, then, both Colker and Delgado appreciate the
diversity of identities within the objective32 groups "women" or
"blacks." At the same time, however, the group-based strategies they
each propose assume some type of core subjective identity that corresponds to these objective group labels.
2. Group Representation in Deliberative Institutions. — Conceptions of group-based representation in the political sphere also illustrate this inconsistency. The writings of Iris Young, for example,
reveal a similar tension between essentialist and antiessentialist views.
Young seems to agree that an essentialist portrayal of individual identity is inadequate, arguing that "[a] social group should not be understood as an essence . . . with a specific set of common attributes.
Instead, group identity should be understood in relational terms. . . .
28 Delgado, supra note 25, at 1227 (internal citation omitted).
29 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79
VA. L. REV. 461, 482 (1993).
" Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 577 (1984) [hereinafter Delgado, The Imperial Scholar]; see also Richard
Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 1 3497 1 354-55 (1992) ("When a middle-class, white male scholar sees articles
written by outsider scholars published in the top law reviews, he may well ask himself why he
should continue writing about those same issues, with which he has a much more tenuous
connection.").
31 Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, supra note 30, at 567.
32 The term objective refers to a group that is defined by a common ascriptive characteristic.
A member of such a group nonetheless may fail to identify subjectively with the group.
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There is no common nature that members of a group have."33
Although "[a] social group . . . is not defined primarily by a set of
shared attributes, but by the sense of identity that people have,"34
Young assumes that "black Americans" are a social group. She notes
that blacks may be defined as such not because of their skin color, but
because of their "identification . . . with a social status, a common
history that social status produces, and a self-identification that defines
the group as a group." 35 Yet this definition implies that blacks identify as a group because of the discrimination they have suffered on the
basis of their skin color — which, in turn, implies that blacks identify
as a group because of their skin color. This implicit approval of race(and gender-) based group identification allows Young to propose that
participation in representative governmental bodies be based on one's
membership in an "oppressed [social] group[ ] . 36 In Young's view, a
democracy should .provide mechanisms, such as "group generation of
policy proposals" and "group veto power," to achieve the effective representation of the perspectives of "oppressed or disadvantaged"
groups, 37 or groups defined by, among other things, race or gender.38
For Young, then, it appears either that grouping by race and by gender merely provides a shorthand for categorizing individuals, or that
she does, after all, affirm an essentialist perspective in some form.
Anne Phillips, another proponent of group-based representation,
recognizes the inconsistencies that may result when one both seeks
group-based solutions for overcoming political exclusion and affirms
an individualized conception of identity. Observing that "[t]he legitimacy of group representation depends on some mechanism for establishing what the group in question wants," Phillips contends that
"[o]ne [possibility] is the implausible essentialism that sees shared experience as enough of a guarantee of shared belief; the other is the ['unlikely/ organization of some sufficiently representative segment."39
Although Phillips eschews the notion that there is "some essential set
of experiences and interests that can be represented by any interchangeable combination of women," 4° she argues thal gender quotas
are a valid means of achieving gender parity in political institutions.'"
For Phillips, "the variety of women's interests does not refute the
claim that interests are gendered. . . . The argument from interest
does not depend on establishing a unified interest of all women: it depends, rather, on establishing a difference between the interests of
33 Young, supra note to, at 260.
34 Au. at 259.
35 Id. at 260.
36 Id. at 265.
37 IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND ME POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 184 (1990).
38 See id. at 184-91.
11-LtiP5S4,- supra note 13, at 55.
3409 /PdH. a
41 See id. at 57-83.
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women and men." 42 But a necessary corollary of establishing a difference between the interests of women and those of men is that women
share a set of common interests after all. On this basis, women as a
group may be distinguished from men as a group.43
III.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROUP BIGHTS AND
ANTIESSENTIALISM IN SUBSTANTIVE LAW

The debate between individual and group rights in the political
realm parallels a debate between formal and substantive jurisprudence
in the realm of law. Liberal political principles require legal formality,
or the "rule of law": decisions must "rest[] on reasons . . . that in their
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result." 44 Accordingly, in this mode of adjudication, "a principled decision" 45 is one
that treats all persons equally and does not differentiate among them
according to their Particular backgrounds or situations.
Whereas formal, rule-based law is the legal realm's counterpart to
liberal universalist premises and individual rights, contextualized, result-oriented law is its counterpart to group-based rights and, more
generally, to the antiuniversalist reaction to liberal principles. The
goal of this substantive alternative is to overcome rigid rule application and to reflect within law the social and cultural differences that
are manifest in politics and society. But the conflict between antiessentialist and essentialist premises embodied by proposals for group
rights does not dissipate when the subject is not group rights per se,
but rather a notion of substantive jurisprudence. Substantive adjudication, as an alternative to formal adjudication, is illusory: it cannot
achieve its purported goal of complete contextualization because, like
42 Id. at 68.
43 Admittedly, women's biological differences from men and the prevalent discrimination
based on them have resulted in a generally observable, distinct social position for women: as
Phillips points out, women "are typically concentrated. . . in lower paid jobs; and they carry the
primary responsibility for the unpaid work of caring for others." See id. at 66. But the claim
that biological difference has been the basis of discrimination against women in the socioeconomic
and political realms is quite different from the claim that all women, as women, share some set of
objectives or interests for purposes of remedial measures.
In contrast to Young's and Phillips's proposals, Lath Guinier's suggestions for overhauling the
liberal "one person, one vote" basis of representation in deliberative bodies in order to provide a
political voice to previously excluded members of society (specifically, African-Americans) admirably recognize the problem of confining people to a particular identity group. Guilder proposes, for
example, "cumulative voting," a solution that "permits voters to self-select their identities [and]
• . . encourages cross-racial coalition building. No one is locked into a minority identity. Nor is
anyone necessarily isolated by the identity they choose." LANI GUINIER, TFIE TYRANNY OF INS.
MAJORITY 16 (1994).
44 HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 27 (196 / ).
45 Id. A legal system based on formal law may be considered nomologically rational, or rational in the sense of according with rules of reason. See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 654-58 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., zd ed. 1978).
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the notion of group rights, it relies on identity categories for its
coherence.
Whereas the foundation of group rights lies in a rejection of liberal
universalist political principles, the argument in favor of substantive
jurisprudence is a reaction against formal law. This argument is based
both on a conception of the nature of law and on a notion that law is
structurally biased.
A. The Nature of Law

One argument in favor of substantive jurisprudence is that, as a
descriptive matter, American jurisprudence embodies two distinct rhetorical modes: formal rules as the arbiter of justice and substantive
approaches that lead to ad hoc equitable results. 46 Further, this argument recognizes that liberal law presently draws predominantly from
the form side of the form/substance dichotomy. Thus, the observation
that one's status as a racial minority or a woman is at odds with liberalism's assertion of abstract sameness among persons has spawned a
vision of substance-based jurisprudence that is oriented toward care,
community, context, and responsibility. This vision aspires to increase
law's recognition of both differences among persons and a multiplicity
of identities.
Kenneth Karst, for example, has explored how infusing law with
such values is desirable because these values are as valid as individual
rights based values, yet have been given short shrift in American
law. 47 Observing that "women generally . . . tend to see the world
differently [from men]," 48 Karst contends that women's preference for
contextualization is "grounded in the needs of real people in the fullness of their real situations." 49 He thus proposes a search for "possible
contributions of women's world view to our constitutional law," 5 ° in
46 This idea of a duality of rhetorical modes in law corresponds to the notion in psychology
that men and women have different paths of moral development. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE passim (1984. Carol Gilligan's argument that a moral conception based on
relationships and responsibility exists .alongside a universalist, rights-based moral conception, see
id. at 142, implies that there are two competing — yet equally valid — ways of approaching
moral questions, neither of which carries an imprimatur of "rightness."
47 See Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DOKE L.J. 447, 480-508.
48 Id. at 486. Karst maintains that women "tend to distrust the effort to resolve a moral
dilemma according to a hierarchy of abstract rules," id. at 495, and seek instead "the reconstruction of the dilemma in its contextual particularity," id. (quoting GILLIGAN, supra note 46, at roo)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
49 Id. at 49550 ' Id. at 486. Other writers have suggested incorporating alternative moral stances into the
law. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493,
1524-33 (199 2 ). With regard to bankruptcy law, Karen Gross has argued that because women
may have a different moral perspective on the debtor/creditor relationship, a mediational approach in bankruptcy court may be more appropriate than an adversarial one. See Karen Gross,
Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1506,
1 54 1 , 1 544 (1990).
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an effort to overcome "the limitations of a conception of justice
blinded to the differences in human life."51
Thus, the argument from the perspective of law's nature is that
substantive adjudication can provide an alternative to the screening of
pertinent facts necessitated by adjudication grounded in form. It implies that there is another way to approach law, one that does not
require lawyers to "analyze and define, to take human interactions
apart and categorize the various parts with labels," and to screen out
"most of the contextual facts about the parties." 52 Rather than screen
information, substantive adjudication aspires to permit consideration
of all facts in order to bring about the most just and equitable outcome. As this Note later argues, however, because substantive judgment necessarily is based on an objective analysis — the perspective
of a judge external to an individual's contingent and subjective identity — the full particularity of an individual's situation likely will be
forced into the mdld of his or her ascriptive characteristics. To the
extent that there is in fact a substantive alternative to the universalism
of form, then, this alternative may go only so far before having to rely
on assumptions about identity that place into question the desirability
and the feasibility of the move away from formal jurisprudence.
B. The Bias of Law
A second argument for substance-based approaches in law is that,
because judicial interpretation of abstract individual rights fails to do
justice to individuals' concrete situations and differences, formal analysis actually precludes persons from meaningfully exercising their
rights. According to this argument, rule-bound law is not just in conflict with substantive jurisprudence; it is in fact structurally biased
against certain persons, ends, and identities. Implicit in this argument
is the notion that, by overcoming the liberal assumption of universal
sameness among individuals, law's incorporation of particularity and
difference removes its structural bias.
This conception of law is premised on the notion that law is an
embodiment of ideology, a worldview establishing a structure of
51 Karst, supra note 47, at 496 (quoting GILLIGAN, supra note 46, at too) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In a similar vein, Robin West argues, from the perspective of a responsibilitybased moral conception, that law has been incapable of responding to the social experience of
women: the rule of law, or "patriarchal doctrine," has the effect of "construct[ing], defin[ing], and
delimit[ing] the human being." West, supra note 14, at 67. Because legalism "devalues women, by
not valuing what women value," id., West advocates "legal reforms that will be true to the conditions of women's lives," id. at 70. Others have also written on dual perspectives within law. See
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 75, no (1994) (arguing that the male-oriented adversarial system could be
improved by "effort[s] to solve the conflict or problem that resulted in a dispute in the first
place"); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
VA. L. Rev. 543, 5 84 (1986 ) ("[T]he law has been distorted by its one-sided focus and . . . the
feminine perspective . . . represents a move toward correcting that distortion.").
52 Karst, supra note 47, at 499-
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thought that blinds people to transformative possibilities. Karl Marx,
for example, posited that economic power controlled all other aspects
of social life, including law, and that law, in turn, became a servant of
the ruling capitalist class. 53 In Marx's view, the superstructure of law
both buttressed and legitimated domination, which served to maintain
class relations of subservience and dominance. 54 In the modern conception of law's structural bias, law has a certain autonomy and integrity apart from its repressive and dominating function. 55 Moreover, it
is possible to view law as an active agent of the reconstruction and
modification of the basic rules of society: the superstructure moderates
class struggle by incorporating some demands of dominated groups.56
Nonetheless, the structure remains, supporting a unitary intellectual
framework in both cases and doctrine.57
The argument from the perspective of law's bias concedes that formal law might be acceptable if society were just. Because formal law
obscures transforrnative possibilities, however, its use is acutely problematic in an unjust society. Thus, as Max Weber contended, remedying inequality requires the rejection of formality. Observing the plight
of "[t]he propertyless masses," who "especially are not served by the
formal 'equality before the law' and the 'calculable' adjudication and
administration demanded by bourgeois interests," Weber asserted that,
for the poor, "justice" should "equalize their economic and social lifeopportunities in the face of the propertied classes."58 To achieve this
objective, then, law would have to become informal and "ethical'
with respect to substantive content."59
Yet even if, in Morton Horwitz's modern formulation, formal law
"creates formal equality [but] . . . promotes substantive inequality, MO
at what point does the drive for substantive equality turn on itself,
53 See Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Part I (1932), reprinted in THE 1VIARX-ENGELS

174 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) ("[E]ach new class which puts itself in the
place of one ruling before it, is compelled . . . to represent its interest as the common interest of
all the members of society . . . .").
54 See id. at 172-74.
55 See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1112 (1980)
(noting that although the "vision of society" behind the development of the law of municipal
corporations "may be gone forever," the early formulation of that law, "stripped of its ideological
underpinnings, largely remains intact today").
56 See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 26 5, 337 (1978) r[T]he attempt to
ease the oppression of working people through legal reform ended by reinforcing the institutional
bases of that oppression, however much it improved the material circumstances of organized
workers.").
57 See, e.g., id. at 292 (observing with regard to labor law reform in the 1930s that the
Supreme Court built a legal structure that blocked an alternative path for the development of
labor law — a path that would have led to a more participatory workplace).
58 2 WEBER, supra note 45, at 980.
59 Id.
60 Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561,
566 (1977) (book review).
READER 146,
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creating new inequities in place of the old ones? As this Note later
argues, although judges may justifiably consider in discrimination
cases those features of individuals that have served as a basis for their
unequal treatment, outside of the discrimination context it is an arbitrary matter whether individuals' subjective identities happen to
match the objective identities that contextualized law attributes to
them.
IV.

THE UNIVERSALIST IMPULSE OF CONTEXTUALIZED LAW

A. Group Rights, Essentialism, and Universalism

The view that essentialist assumptions are undesirable but groupbased remedial strategies are desirable contains a contradiction. Any
type of group right that is representational in nature 61 has an essentialist implication for the persons who are, from an objective perspective, within the group. To agree with Phillips 62 that there must be a
certain number of women in a deliberative political body because
there is a difference between women's and men's interests 63 is to say
that women, as women, have certain interests that not only are different from "men's interests," but also are necessarily held by anyone
who is a woman. Likewise, the argument that hiring a black faculty
member is justified by the fact that he or she may serve as a role
model for black students is to say both that blacks have unified interests, and that those interests are necessarily shared by any student
who happens to be black.64
This manifestation of essentialist perspectives may be viewed as a
re-creation of universalist difficulties. Discrimination happens not on
the basis of one's subjective identity but instead as a result of an objective fact about one's skin color or gender. The use of categories of
discrimination as a basis for remedial action, however, implies a false
sameness of identity among persons who, by virtue of possessing a
particular attribute, objectively fall into such categories. Thus,
although the purpose of group rights is to inject real world situations
into abstract universalist politics, such rights in fact depend on assumptions about identity 63 and thus may be said to recreate at a different level the same difficulties for which universal individual rights
are criticized. 66 Put another way, although group rights are not universalist in a general or abstract sense in the way that liberal individ61 See supra note I.
62 See supra pp. 12 99-1300.
63 This Note makes no statement about quotas that are justified on other, non-representa-

tional bases, such as the goal of reducing disparities between the numbers of men and women in
elite positions.
64 See =PM pp. 1297-98; Addis, supra note 27, at 1400-01.
65 See supra pp. 1297-1300.
66 cf Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, iio HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming June
1997) (arguing that a diversity of experience and consciousness among women creates a
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ual rights are, because they are essentialist with regard to identity they
reintroduce universalist concerns in a concrete or specific sense. Thus,
if the problem with universalist individual rights is that they assume
an abstract sameness among persons in a political community, group
rights are similarly problematic. Unlike individual rights, however,
group rights require courts and legislatures to make judgments or assumptions about pre-political identities, categorizing and defining persons in advance of their participation in the public realm.
B. Universalism in Substantive Jurisprudence

That group rights themselves connect with a universalist impulse
has important implications for the project of contextualizing law. To
the extent that substance-based jurisprudence requires that judgments
be based in part on the fact of one's objective status, such jurisprudence fails to be a completely equitable counterpart to form-based adjudication. Substantive adjudication functions not through completely
contextualizing law, but rather through regarding individuals as belonging to a group that corresponds to a particular identity label.67
As noted in Part HI, the nature of law rationale for substantive
jurisprudence — that there exists a mostly unacknowledged equitable
counterpart to formal jurisprudence, one that lets in all relevant facts
and circumstances — must be qualified by recognizing that not all
relevant facts about identity can be perceived by an externally posi"countermajoritarian dilemma" for feminism's tendency to assume a unified group interest among
women).
67 For example, although the "reasonable man" standard both discounts important aspects of
individuals' experiences and embodies bias, see, e.g., Caroline A. Forell, Essentialism, Empathy,
and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL L. REV. 769, 775, thus evidencing a need to particularize mens rea analysis, alternatives such as the "reasonable woman" standard recast the reasonable
man's universalism in a different mold. Indeed, a judge or jury who is asked to consider what is
reasonable for a particular individual is limited to considering only those aspects of the individual
that are objectively identifiable, and the most identifiable aspects are those that are commonly
presumed to give an individual his or her identity: race or gender. Ciontextualization in contract
law is also illustrative. The critique of universalist formal law implies that contract law should
not be concerned exclusively with the objective contents of a particular agreement or the subjective understandings of the parties, but also (or instead) with what women expect from contractual
relationships. This critique further implies that a judge should infer from an individual's racial or
cultural background something about how that individual "must" have understood the agreement
at issue. In such situations, however, from the perspective of individual women and minorities
with diverse identities, contract becomes mysterious, paternalistic, and as universalist as the presumption of an abstract arms-length relationship between Party A and Party B. Cf Robert S.
Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism,
and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 124 X , 1325 (1 993) ( arguing that because oppression lingers
as long as "identity is defined.. . in contradistinction to others," racial, and by implication gender, categorization is of limited utility).
Distinctions among groups that are based on race and gender are different from distinctions
based on socioeconomic status or environmental influences. Therefore, to the extent that contextuali7ation in contract law and family law focuses on economic stratification and the resultant
imbalances of power between parties to a contract or a divorce, it does not encounter universalist
difficulties. See infra note 77.
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tioned decisionmaker. This qualification, however, is at the same time
an observation that, in some sense, substance is a re-creation of universalist form. In other words, taking account of substance in adjudication requires the evaluation of identity, despite the fact that identity
is too complex for substantive adjudication to do justice to: judges
look to the past to determine what objective groups have suffered
from oppression and discrimination, and employ such retrospective determinations as the basis of present decisionmaking. They thereby recreate formal law's presumption of sameness, but this time for persons
who are objectively within a racial or gender identity group, whose
subjective identities nonetheless may not accord with that of the
group.
Similarly, with regard to the argument about bias within law, it is
unclear that substantive equality is ever fully achievable, to the extent
that substantively important factors about identity are beyond the
scope of judges' pergeptions. Thus, the attempt to achieve substantive
equality may lead to new types of inequalities between those persons
whose identities are more aligned with their objective characteristics
and those persons for whom this alignment does not hold. This failure
of substantive jurisprudence to take individuals' concrete situations
and differences into account, and its placement of persons within identity groups with which they may not in fact identify, renders it vulnerable to the objection that it is dependent on some alternative structure
of perception. Thus, it is at best arbitrarily substantive, successfully
contextualizing law only when an individual's subjective identity
aligns with the identity that has been imposed on him or her from
without on the basis of his or her objective attributes. And much like
rule-bound formal law, it is at worst actually biased against particular
groups of persons.68
V. FORMAL RULES: NOT WHETHER, BUT

How?

A. The Rule of (Formal) Law vs. The Rule of (Substantive) Law

If "doing justice" means that judgment should be fully contextualized and "grounded in the needs of real people in the fullness of their
real situations,"69 truly contextual judgment remains in some sense beyond law's potentiality: judges may only approximate contextualization when they categorize according to objective or apparent group
membership. Attending to the real situations of real persons, it turns
out, results in overlooking subjective identifications and focusing on
objective circumstances and associations.
68 For example, contextualization in the form of the "reasonable woman" standard, see supra
note 67, may be most unfair to a woman whose education or environment has led her to reject
many of the assumptions that the reasonable woman supposedly accepts.
69 Karst, supra note 47, at 495-
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Moreover, it may seem that it is impossible for substantive law to
be nomologically rational, and that, therefore, formal law is the exclusive province of nomological rationality. One implication of the foregoing analysis, however, may be that what has come to be called
substantive justice is itself bound to nomological rationality. To the
extent that substantive law forms its own rules based on the categorization of persons and thus is not tantamount to complete contextualization, what has become known as substantive law in fact shares a
crucial feature with formal law. Although the prevalence of concerns
for substantive justice may lead "the style of legal discourse [to] approach[ ] that of commonplace political or economic argument,"" substantive law may still retain a certain formal character.71
Substantive jurisprudence, therefore, is not able to solve the
problems of inequity and bias created by abstract individual rights
and formal rules; it only particularizes the overarching collective into
which an individual is assumed to fit In addition, because all law
screens realities, there is no clear choice between formal law and contextualized, substantive law. Although law may take new categories
and contextual considerations into account, it cannot escape its own
legalism and become fully contextual. Thus, a question more interesting than whether law screens aspects of reality is how it can best do
so. If individual and group rights, and formal and substantive jurisprudence, fail to take full account of all of the differences among persons, what types of rights and jurisprudence are more justifiable, or
more just, in a legal practice that is inescapably bound in some way to
the rule of law?
Truly contextualized and unbiased jurisprudence would regard
identity as completely contingent, and would perceive the role of socioeconomic status, in addition to ascriptive characteristics and other
myriad (externally unascertainable) factors, in shaping each person's
identity. But it follows from the notion that substantive law is to
some degree formalist that such jurisprudence would not be possible
without undermining the very possibility of lawJ 2 In the following
discussion, this Note suggests that there may exist alternatives to categorizing on the basis of race or gender. In particular, it addresses an
70 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 199 (1976).
71 This notion is not inconsistent with Roberto Unger's observation that the turn away from
rule-based legal reasoning "is connected with the need . . . judges have of reaching out to the
substantive ideals of different groups, of drawing upon a conventional morality or a dominant
tradition." Id. at zoo (emphasis added). Contextualizing law means addressing group differences
— such as traditions, conventions, and mores — rather than individual differences.
72 This argument challenges the suggestion that law should overcome essentialist difficulties
by making categories "contingent" or "tentative." See, e.g., Harris, supra note 2, at 586 (suggesting that "we [should] make our categories explicitly tentative, relational, and unstable, and
that to do so is all the more important in a discipline like law, where abstraction and 'frozen'
categories are the norm"). Because law simply is not equipped to flow with the shifting sands of
identity formation, abstraction in some form is always necessary.
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alternative approach to infusing formal law with context without producing new but inaccurate notions of universal sameness.
B. Economic Difference as an Alternative Focus

An alternative to group rights based on race or gender might be,
for example, a conception of rights whose basis is economic difference. 73 This conception is based on the argument that racial minorities and women of higher socioeconomic status are disproportionately
the targets and beneficiaries of group-based remedial strategies. 74 Because politics and law identify persons not on the basis of socioeconomic status but on the basis of ascriptive identity, minorities and
women in lower socioeconomic classes have little basis on which to
challenge economic disparities. 75 Thus, this alternative holds that
present economic disadvantage, rather than past discrimination, should
be the basis of remedial action.76
In this light, economic rights — rights that, as traditionally conceived, ensure that individuals have a minimal level of material wellbeing — may provide a more fruitful approach to contextualizing politics than race- or gender-based rights. Moreover, judicial recognition
of economic difference may be a more appropriate focus for substantive adjudication. Because economic rights may be conceived of as
individual rights, persons possess such rights — as in liberal theory —
73 Identity group based approaches to law and politics are problematic because they assume
that social and political division on the basis of ascriptive characteristics, being the most visible
division, is also the most fundamental division. Yet because relatively well-off minorities and
women suffer less discrimination than their poorer counterparts — and have the resources to
pursue litigation against that which they do face — upper-class individuals are relatively well
assimilated. See Brooks, supra note 2, at 22, 26-27. Thus, the most vulnerable groups (poor
minorities and poor women) are actually harmed through use of the monolithic terms "race" or
"gender," which indicates that socioeconomic class may constitute a social division that is as
meaningful as race or gender. Cf. JENNIFER L. HocHscHum, FACING UF TO THE AMERICAN
DREAM 49 (1995) (noting that, whereas "[t]he poorest fifth of African Americans lost almost as
large a share of their income as the richest fifth gained of theirs" during the period 1983-1992,
the incomes of well-off African-Americans increased by the same proportion as those of well-off
whites); Brooks, supra note 2, at 28 ("In failing to differentiate among the socioeconomic strata
. . . within African American society when using the term race, civil rights discourse can be
useless or even damaging.").
74 See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 110 (1978)
("[A]ffirmative action programs are not designed to deal with the problem of the disproportionate
concentration of blacks in the low-wage labor market.").
75 See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 53 (1986).
Unger argues that there is a need for a system of "destabilization" rights which, "Mather than just
correct[ing] specific collective disadvantages within the circumscribed area of state action, . . .
would also seek to break up entire areas of institutional life and social practice" — thereby overcoming an "arbitrarily selective focus upon [race- and gender-based] group inferiority . . . to the
exclusion of" that which is class-based. Id
76 See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
183-209 (1996). But see Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, supra note 30, at 570 (arguing that "the
adoption of. . . present-oriented perspectives . . . robs affirmative action programs of their moral
force in favor of a sterile theory of fairness or utility").
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because they are free and equal moral beings. At the same time, because they ensure not mere freedom from government interference but,
instead, a certain level of well-being, they necessarily look to individual circumstances and situations for their efficacy. In the realm of jurisprudence, moreover, individuals' particular socioeconomic situations
could be a source of substance that does not create new universalist
categories and biases. 77 Thus, judicial recognition of socioeconomic
stratification may go far toward addressing the social division for
which gender and race differences traditionally have served as inaccurate proxies.78
VI. CONCLUSION

Founded on a recognition of difference among persons, group-based
rights purport to affirm antiessentialist and antiuniversalist principles.
Their aspiration is both to affirm an antiessentialist perspective of
identity and to provide a correction to the assumption of an abstract
universal equality among all individuals. Yet the antiessentialist and
antiuniversalist sentiments at the heart of visions of group rights are
undermined by the visions themselves. As two different responses to
liberal universalist principles, group rights and antiessentialist premises
stand in tension with one another. By embodying essentialist assumptions about identity, group rights create a new type of universalist difficulty, which extends to the realm of substantive jurisprudence and
suggests that law cannot be fully contextual. The task at hand, then,
should be to develop alternative approaches to make contextualization
in law and politics less elusive and less illusory.
77 That is, economic difference may be regarded as more meaningful difference in many situations: in contract law or family law, for example, to the extent that one party to a contract or a
divorce has more resources than the other, there exists a power disparity between them, which
has de facto implications for the fairness of outcomes.
78 In addition, it is at least conceivable that contextualizing law on the basis of individual
economic particularities could allow for an alternative approach to group-based contextualization,
one that is able to avoid the pitfalls of grouping persons according to ascriptive characteristics.
Group strategies and categorization based on economic difference are able to avoid essentialist —
and thus universalist — difficulties, not because one's objective identity in the economic realm
(his or her socioeconomic class) is the same as his or her subjective identity, but because persons
may not have such a subjective identity. Economic identities, unlike political identities, are calculable, predictable, and objective. As such, one's economic interest is reducible to one's self-interest. In a word, economic identities are "essential."

